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NOTES
THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE
CONVERSION BY CONTRACT.
The doctrine of equitable conversion by contract is ap-
parently an established one in the common law. However, for
some time, there has been dissatisfaction with it due to incon-
sistencies and certain improper results. The doctrine itself
is a fiction, one of those plagues from the Pandora's box of the
law, which are loosed on us by judges who do not know how else
to reach certain results. Benjamin N. Cardozo, now justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States has made a four-fold
division of the forces to be obeyed and the methods to be fol-
lowed in creating judicial precedents. "Our division separates
the force of logic and analogy, which gives us the method of
philosophy; the force of history, which gives us the historical
method, or the method of evolution; the force of custom, which
yields the method of tradition; and the force of justice, morals,
and social welfare, with its outlet or method in sociology."
Certain legal writers among whom are Stone and Williston have
attacked the doctrine of equitable conversion on the bases that
it reaches improper results in many cases, and that the proper
results could be reached without the application of the fiction.
These men, in this, have followed the force of logic and analogy,
coupled with the force of justice, morals, and social control.
It is our purpose in this paper to follow, if we can, the force
of history and show, if possible, that the doctrine of equitable
conversion by contract finds no proper place historically in our
jurisprudence. Whether we axe able to completely establish
this thesis must depend on an examination of the authorities.
Historically the doctrine of equitable conversion by con-
tract probably developed more by analogy to the law of trusts
than on the basis of the doctrine of specific performance.' At
common law the buyer of chattels who had paid or become in-
debted to the purchaser for the purchase money had an action
of detinue against the seller. Similarly the buyer of land who
had paid or become a debtor for the price of the land was, in
1Sidney P. Simpson: Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable
Conversion by Contract, 44 Yale Law Journal 559, Note 3 (1934).
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equity given the rights of a cestui que use. In 1506 Rede,
J. said: "For the sake of argument, I will agree that if one
seised to his own use sells the land, he shall be a feoffee to the
use of the buyer." 2 Just how early in the reign of Henry VIII
the opinion of Rede, J. prevailed is not clear but certainly be-
fore the Statute of Uses.3
It should be noted here that the time of which we are now
speaking is before the rise of the doctrine of specific perform-
ance. In spite of opinion to the contrary,4 Ames has shown
that the doctrine of specific performance did not arise until the
reign of Elizabeth.5 At least, if it was developed earlier, it did
not come into prominence until that time.0  Clearly then it was
necessary that the use should arise, if the vendee of the prop-
erty was to be protected. He was liable to suit at law for the
purchase money, and could only get damages when he might
want the land, since the law of contract was still, at this time,
laboring under the burden of independent conditions. These
were not removed until the case of Kingston v. Preston'
The vendee thus gained prominence as the holder of a use.
Perhaps the use in the vendee might have been executed by the
Statute of Uses. If such had been the case, the doctrine of
equitable conversion by contract would have been unnecessary.
However the narrower construction prevailed and the executory
contract was left to the second spring of growth on the tree
of uses, the trust, and to the rising doctrine of specific per-
formance. 8
After the failure of the courts to execute the use in the
vendee and thus give him legal title, nothing was more natural
than for equity, after the rise of the doctrine of trusts, to de-
clare that the vendor was a trustee for the vendee. This is the
idea which the court followed in Daire v. Beversham9 wherein
it was ruled that the purchaser had an equity by the contract to
recover the lands and the vendor stood entrusted for him until
- Anonymous, Y. B. 21 Hen. VII, f. 18, pl. 30 (1506).
-'Ames: Lectures on Legal History, 239 (1913).
1 Chafee and Simpson: Cases on Equity, 245 (note).
Ames: Lectures on Legal History, 249 (1913).
"Bordwe:. Equity and the Law of Property, 20 Iowa Law Rev. 1,
29 (1934).
'2 Douglas 689 (1773).
8 Bordwell: Equity and the Law of Property, 20 Iowa Law Rev. 1,
28-29 (1934).
0 Nels. 76, 21 Eng. Rep. 793 (1661).
K. L. J.-5
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a legal conveyance was executed. Since the vendor held the
land in trust for the vendee, the property was burdened with
the trust estate and would be subject to the trust in the hands
of the heir of the vendor.10 These cases do not apply any doe-
trine of equitable conversion. The total result arrived at by
them seems to be that the land always passes subject to the
burden of the contract, and that the purchaser has an equity
which is subject to devise. This interest is in the nature of the
equitable right to demand specific performance.
That the doctrine of which we are speaking had not arisen
prior to this time is demonstrated by the case of Wentworth v.
Young." Here the question involved was the disposition of
money articled to be laid out in land. The court was of the
opinion that if the land had actually been purchased, it should
have gone to the heir, but, if the money was not turned into
land, it should go as personalty to the next of kin. It may be
that these cases whereby money is articled to be laid out in land,
and of a direction in a will or deed that money is to be turned
into land, are not in point on equitable conversion by contract.
However, in view of the fact that a little later the court treats
all of these types of cases as depending on the same principle,
it would seem that all are in point on the developnent of the
doctrine. 12
The idea of a conversion was not long in appearing after
these cases. In Kettleby v. Atwood' 3 the facts briefly were
that by articles of marriage money was to be laid out in land to
the use of the husband and wife and their issue, remainder to
the husband in fee. The husband died leaving a son who died
without issue. The heir of the husband brought a bill against
the administratrix to have the money invested in lands to be
settled on him. The bill was dismissed. The Lord Keeper said,
""Where a man contracts for the purchase of lands and dies be-
fore the assurance is executed, the heir of the vendor stands trusted
for the purchaser and is compellable in this court to execute the
estate to him, and the trusts here are of another nature than the uses
are at common law." Stephens v. Baily, Nels. 106, 21 Eng. Rep. 802
(1665). For a later application of the trust doctrine see Gell v. Ver-
medun, 2 Freeman 198 (1694). In Bubb's Case, Freeman's Chan.
Cas. 38 (1678), so often cited as an application of the doctrine of
equitable conversion, it is evident that the court did not apply any
such doctrine, nor is it necessary to reach the result.
1 Nels. 35, 21 Eng. Rep. 783 (1638).
'2Fletcher v. Ashburner, 28 Eng. Rep. 1259 (1779).
211 Vern. 299, 23 Eng. Rep. 481 (1684).
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"I do not see what equity the heir has against the administra-
trix." However in Kettleby v. Atwood 14 the decision was re-
versed on the ground that the money was bound by the articles
and should have gone to the benefit of the heir as the lands
should have gone in case the money had been laid out according
to the articles. Lord Thurlow, in speaking of this case says
that the reversal proceeded on the equitable maxim that in
equity what is to be done is considered as done.'1 Here ap-
parently we have a true conversion. The doctrine does not
come from an idea of a right to specific performance but from
the application of the equitable maxim.1 6
In spite of the fact that the doctrine was applied to cases
where money was articled to be laid out in land, 17 this was not
considered the proper result in all such cases. Where money
articled to be laid out in land came to one who might have
aliened the land in case the purchase had been made, before the
purchase there was no conversion and the money passed as per-
sonalty.' 8  In Pultney v. Darlington 9 it is said that this is the
correct rule, and speaking of Kettleby v. Atwood,20 the court
says: "The reversal proceeded upon the cant expression that
in equity what is to be done is considered as done. Either that
idea should have been carried fully out, or it should have been
abandoned. I think it should have been the later."
That the doctrine of equitable conversion by contract was
not settled at this time is shown by the risk of loss cases. In
ease of an eviction by title paramount before performance of
the contract, the vendee was relieved of the duty of paying for
the land. -1 Apparently Cass v. Rudele22 is opposed to our view
that at this time the risk of loss was placed on the vendee. How-
ever Sudgen says that this case was misstated in the report in
"'1 Vern. 471, 23 Eng. Rep. 596 (1687).
1 Pultney v. Darlington, 1 Bro. C. C. 223 (1778).
" See also an interesting application of the doctrine of equitable
conversion by will in Sweetapple v. Bindon, 23 Eng. Rep. 947 (1705),
where the husband was given tenancy by the courtesy in money de-
vised to be laid out in land to the use of his dead wife.
1 Kettleby v. Atwood, 1 Vern. 471, 23 Eng. Rep. 596 (1687); and
Best v. Stamford, 91 Eng. Rep. 141, 142 (1689).
11 Chickester v. Biggerstaff, 2 Vern. 295 (1693); contra Kettleby v.
Atwood, supra, note 17.
"1 Bro. C. C. 223 (1778).
Supra, not, 17.
'Anonymous, 2 Chan. Cas. 19 (1679).
22 Vern. 280, 23 Eng. Rep. 781 (1692).
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Vernon and that the decree was founded on a good title having
been conveyed. 25 In Sent v. Balis24 the court intimates by way
of dictum that in case of fire before the performance of the
contract the loss is to fall on the vendor.2 5
So far the result of our study must lead us to the conclu-
sion that in case of an executory contract to purchase lands,
the doctrine of equitable conversion was not applied. The cases
were worked out on a trust doctrine. The only instance in
which the statement is false is White v. Nutts26 and that case
may be considered a transitional case. It must be borne in mind
that while the chancery courts were applying the trust doctrine
to the contract cases, they had apparently worked out a doctrine
of equitable conversion which they applied to cases of marriage
articles, and mandatory instructions in deeds and wills to lay
out money in the purchase of lands. These cases were based
on the application of the equitable maxim.
All that now remains in the development of the doctrine
of equitable conversion by contract is to apply this maxim to
the contract cases. This was the next step. "What ought. to
have been done shall be taken as done; and a rule so powerful
it is as to alter the very nature of things; to make money land,
and on the contrary to turn land into money; thus money
articled to be laid out in land shall be taken as land and shall
descend to the heir, and, on the other hand, land agreed to be
sold shall be considered as personal." 27 The principle on which
this equity is founded is the rule that whatever is stipulated
to be done shall there be considered as done. It follows as a
necessary consequence that money contracted to be laid out in
231 Sudgen on Vendors (7th Am. Ed. 1851) 388.
24 24 Eng. Rep. 705 (1724).
2 Contra White v. Nutts, 24 Eng. Rep. 294 (1702). V covenanted
to sell an estate for two lives to P. After the contract but before the
time for conveyance, one of the lives was dropped. Held: That the
loss should fall on the vendee. In equity the estate is as conveyed
from the time the articles are sealed. However the court said by way
of dictum that if both the lives had been dropped the loss would have
fallen on the vendor since he would have had nothing to convey. It
is difficult to see a distinction between one life and two so far as the
application of the doctrine is concerned.
21 Supra, note 25.
nLechmere v. Carlisle, 24 Eng. Rep. 1033, 1035 (1733). See also
Milner v. Mills, Mosley 123 (1729); and Green v. Smith, 26 Eng. Rep.
360 (1738).
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land, being from the time of the contract bound thereby, must
from thence forth be taken as land.28
It is apparent then that the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion by contract is not an outgrowth of the doctrine of specific
performance. Rather it would seem to come from an applica-
tion of the equitable maxim, "What is contracted to be done
is considered as done," to cases which had formerly been de-
cided on a trust doctrine. It apparently was worked out by
analogy to equitable conversion by deed or will, and no his-
torical basis for the analogy appears. We will not attempt to
say that the application of the analogy was a mistake but cer-
tainly the doctrine itself had no historical basis at the time of
its establishment.
JOHN i. DAvis.
'9 2 Powell on Contracts 53 (1825). Powell also intimates that the
doctrine of equitable conversion by contract did not arise prior to
1700 when he says that the doctrine was acknowledged as early as
1720. 2 Powell on Contracts 56.
